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Disagreements over the nature of the divide between continental and 
analytical philosophy are perhaps as common as disputes between these 
two parts of the discipline. A consequence of the heterogeneity of 
understandings of this division is that attempts to cross it are often 
isolated cases rather than widespread philosophical practices. Jeremy 
Arnold’s Across the Great Divide: Between Analytic and Continental 
Political Theory represents one such attempt to construct a bridge 
between the two traditions within political philosophy rather than 
philosophy as such. In doing so he makes two claims: that ‘political 
theorists and philosophers ought to engage in…cross-tradition theorizing’ 
and that what he calls ‘aporetic cross-tradition theorizing is a viable and 
attractive mode of cross-tradition theorizing’ (14). In contrast to what 
Arnold calls the synthetic mode, which seeks to unify the two traditions 
within a single theory, the aporetic mode highlights the incompatibilities 
between the two traditions and shows how neither can give exhaustive 
accounts of political concepts. Arnold’s claim that the aporetic mode is a 
desirable mode of thinking across traditions is compelling due to the 
strength it lends to arguments in favour of theoretical and 
methodological pluralism in political theory. However, one might 
question the extent to which the aporetic mode is truly as agnostic with 
respect to method as it is intended to be. 
Before moving to an overview and evaluation of the argument that 
Arnold makes in favour of the aporetic mode, it is worth highlighting the 
complexity that is added to the task of defining the divide between 
continental and analytic schools when it is examined within political 
philosophy. Within philosophy, one can begin from clear historical 
examples, as Arnold does (1-3), in which divisions between Husserl and 
Heidegger, on the one hand, and thinkers such as Ryle, Russel, Carnap 
and Frege, on the other, were established in the early to mid 20th century. 
It is a more complex task to identify the manner in which this division 
was transferred to political philosophy because of what Arnold 
acknowledges as the discipline’s ‘capacious’ character (5). Oscillation 
between the terminology of ‘political theory’ and ‘political philosophy’ 
indicates nominal differences which unfold in a variety of ways, such as 
the distinction between those based in philosophy departments and 
those in political science departments or the way political science and 
political philosophy are differentiated. In addition to the 
continental/analytical axis, political philosophy or theory is also divided 
along another axis which distinguishes it from political science or 
philosophy more broadly. 
Arnold’s argument is situated within this definitional quagmire and is 
admirable for the clarity of the position which it articulates. 
Political theory, for Arnold, emerges in the context of the influence of 
European emigres to America upon normative debates regarding the 
crisis of liberalism and methodological debates regarding behaviourism 
in political science (4-5). Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, 
and Eric Voegelin are pivotal in the constitution of political theory 
insofar as they carried with them a set of continental influences that 
were critical of both liberalism and positivism, such as Heidegger, 
Nietzsche and Weber. Political philosophy, in contrast, has a simpler 
genealogy. It ‘has its institutional home primarily in philosophy 
departments, which in the Anglophone world are largely analytic’ (4). 
Normative political philosophy owes as much to its proximity to analytic 
moral philosophy as it does to debates about the nature of the political 
(6-7). Consequently, two different approaches to liberalism arise from 
these historical circumstances (7-8). Politically, liberalism is criticised by 
political theorists and endorsed by political philosophers of continental 
and analytic dispositions respectively. Methodologically, analytic 
political philosophers put great stock in the content of intuitions, 
particularly those of a liberal variety, whereas continental political 
theorists are more likely to scrutinise the ideological basis of these 
intuitions due to their scepticism of dominant liberal values. 
That political philosophy is largely analytic and political theory is largely 
continental is cemented by Arnold’s articulation of three key differences 
within the contemporary unfolding of these historical trajectories. First, 
analytical political philosophers engage in justifying resolutions to 
problems found within political concepts, whereas continental political 
philosophers are more concerned with highlighting the impossibility of 
this enterprise (9). Second, this leads to differences in ‘style, 
interdisciplinarity and canon’ (11). An eclectic canon of references in the 
case of continental political philosophy–such as psychoanalysis, 
literature, film studies and neuroscience–leads to a wider diversity of 
argumentative styles, whereas a more tightly honed argumentative style 
is characteristic of analytic philosophy’s lesser use of interdisciplinary 
materials (11-13). Third, where analytical political philosophers work 
within a framework that is at the very least sympathetic to modernity 
and seeks to correct its wrongs, continental political theory is largely 
critical of the consequences of modernity (13-14). 
Arnold’s overview of these differences is striking because it shows 
how Beyond the Great Divide is as much about bridging the divide 
between political theory and political philosophy as much as it is about 
the division between continental and analytic thinkers. To establish 
aporetic cross-tradition theorizing as the most desirable way of bridging 
this gap, Arnold argues that both traditions offer something to the study 
of political phenomena. Political phenomena are dense: a single concept, 
such as freedom, is not only defined by historical complexities and a 
range of practical interpretations; theorists which try to explain them 
bring their own normative and explanatory baggage to these problems 
(14-15). For Arnold, these dense concepts cannot be exhausted by a 
single theory. Consequently, each tradition responds to different 
elements of political problems–analytic political philosophers engage in 
the conceptual justification of reasons for the legitimacy or acceptability 
of particular political practices or expressions of power, whereas 
continental political philosophy highlights the historical, cultural or 
social contingency of those concepts and often the impossibility of any 
‘final’ justification for them. More often than not these are incompatible 
philosophical trajectories. Aporetic cross-tradition theorising is justified 
with reference to the intellectual payoff of utilising both traditions to 
investigate dense phenomena. 
Arnold gives three reasons for this. First, if political phenomena are 
dense and if the methods and approaches within the two traditions that 
approach them are irreconcilable, then no single approach can exhaust 
the complexity of the concepts studied within political theory. Synthetic 
cross-tradition theorising can only fail in the face of the fact that ‘dense 
phenomena contain irreconcilable elements, elements we cannot 
eliminate and cannot unify’ (17). The aporetic mode, in contrast, 
recognises that we cannot resolve these tensions. Second, the aporetic 
mode turns this irresolvability into a virtue. Different phenomena and 
conceptual approaches have a range of intellectual needs. By navigating 
across these approaches, the aporetic mode seeks to ‘discover the limits 
of our intellect’ insofar as a single account will never be exhaustive of 
political phenomena (19). Third, Arnold argues that the aporetic mode 
has ‘at its ethical core the demanded of the singular, embodied, all-too-
real coerced individual, the simple demand for justification, for an 
answer to “why?”’ (20). If analytic political philosophy is often abstract 
and ignores concrete individuals in its justification of particular concepts 
and if continental philosophy focuses on the contingencies of concepts 
and eschews justification, then neither, for Arnold, can truly live up the 
simple fact that political practices involve individuals who need to be 
addressed with a justification for the exercise of power. If these 
approaches are translated into the aporetic mode, this can lead to ‘a 
powerful expression of the unrealizable but valuable ethical and political 
ideal of answering to this person’s subjection to power with 
reasons this person can accept’ (21). With this third claim Arnold 
switches from a methodological to an ethico-political register that 
addresses what he perceives as a deficiency common to both traditions: 
their abstraction from justifications that are acceptable to everyday 
individuals. 
This argument is established over two main sections. The first consists of 
an overview and critique of two approaches to synthetic cross-tradition 
theorizing, realist political philosophy and the work of Stanley Cavell, 
whilst the second consists of two examples of aporetic cross-tradition 
theorizing, comparing Philip Pettit and Arendt, and John Rawls and 
Jacques Derrida. The first section discusses the difficulty of finding a 
justification for state violence in both realism and Cavell, whereas the 
second discusses freedom as found in Pettit and Arendt, and justice as 
found in Rawls and Derrida. Arnold’s aim across these chapters is to 
move from the deficiencies of the synthetic mode of cross-tradition 
theorizing to an advocation of the aporetic mode, whilst also producing 
meaningful insights into the thinkers and topics covered. 
The first substantive chapter of the book deals with realism. According 
to Arnold,  the realist critique of moralism in political philosophy 
represents an example of synthetic cross-tradition theorizing. The goal 
of this synthetic enterprise is the production of claims to legitimacy 
based on terms that would be acceptable to those individuals rather than 
on pre-political moralistic arguments of the kind articulated by figures 
like Rawls, Cohen or Nozick. Realists seek to provide political rather 
than pre-political accounts of justification and of legitimacy. Ultimately, 
Arnold argues, the synthetic mode is not up to this task. This claim is 
based on the argument that realists do not adequately distinguish 
between state legitimacy and the legitimacy of state violence. This 
difficulty arises as much from realism’s synthetic method as it does from 
the intellectual problem of legitimacy. 
Realism is synthetic insofar as it combines the need for justification and 
legitimacy characteristic of the analytic tradition with an attention to 
context, history and conflicting interpretations of political events 
characteristic of continental thought. One might lose a particular 
political battle over the interpretation of, say, whether the state is 
legitimate in imposing a particular form of taxation, but those who 
disagree with such an account may still find its terms acceptable (39). In 
the case of state violence, however, Arnold argues that interpretation 
does not provide a strong enough case for legitimating that violence in 
terms that an individual could accept–for it is likely that there are 
multiple competing interpretations within which state violence is not 
legitimate. Moreover, if in these interpretations state violence is not 
agreeable to the individual who is subject to it, then it can only be 
justified in pre-political terms which realists reject (41). By synthesising 
the analytic justificatory impulse with the continental emphasis on 
interpretation and conflict, realists end up satisfying neither demand in 
the case of state violence (47). Rather than trying to synthesise these two 
demands, Arnold argues that instead the aporia represented by the 
tension between the need for justification and its impossibility should be 
embraced as a core element of realist theorising about legitimacy. 
Violence is also the political issue at stake in Arnold’s critique of Cavell. 
In Cavell’s reading of the social contract tradition, our participation in 
community implies complicity with the exclusions that are a necessary 
part of social life (49-50). Cavell diverges from the classical aim of the 
contract, to justify state violence through consent, in order to explore 
how we are morally compromised by our participation in unjust 
societies. Arnolds’s reading of Cavell makes two claims. First, he argues 
that Cavell’s focus on social violence is too general to make sense of the 
specificity of political issues relating to consent. Second, the focus on 
consent as membership of a community rather than the authorisation 
and legitimation of state action and violence means that Cavellian 
consent cannot account for this integral part of the ‘“grammar” of 
political consent’ (52). Arnold makes this case by emphasising the role 
that the community plays in underpinning the search for reasons in 
Cavell. Claims to reason find their transcendental conditions in 
community and draw on the distinct grammar of those communities 
(58). However, for Arnold Cavell does not provide sufficient detail for 
articulating the grammar of a specifically political community because 
consent is primarily an issue of complicity with social violence that 
arises from one’s participation in community as such (62-3). Consent 
merely implicates one in social violence within a particular community 
but does not expressly authorise the legitimate use of violence by the 
state. 
This reading of Cavell continues the line of argument found in the 
previous chapter on realism, however, the link between synthetic cross-
tradition theorising and the criticism of Cavell’s work is less clear. When 
considered as a form of cross-tradition theorising, realism falls short of 
providing a convincing justification of state violence because its 
synthetic method fails to reconcile the justificatory project of analytic 
political philosophy with continental political theory’s emphasis on 
interpretation. Within Arnold’s critique of Cavell, however, method is at 
a distance from the problem of legitimacy. Cavell utilises a synthetic 
method which treats philosophical texts as texts and not simply as 
examples of political argumentation: a continental method is synthesised 
with analytical texts. Arnold argues that this method falls short insofar 
as by reading texts ‘as texts we will often fail to take them seriously, on 
their own terms’ (75). Cavell’s method fails to treat analytical texts on 
their own terms precisely because he treats them as texts and not as 
pieces of philosophical argumentation. There is no disputing that this is a 
salient issue in an account of why cross-tradition theorising in the 
aporetic mode is superior to the synthetic mode. However, the criticism 
of the substance of Cavell’s account of violence and consent is at a 
remove from this methodological complaint: one might criticise the 
category of social violence without recourse to a critique of synthetic 
cross-tradition theorising. Thus, while both of these points stand it does 
not appear that the account of legitimacy in Cavell is essential to 
pursuing the project of advocating for aporetic cross-tradition theorising, 
and the point against the synthetic mode is somewhat weakened as a 
result (an issue that we will return to). 
Following this critique of Cavell, The Great Divide shifts gear into 
advocating openly for aporetic cross-tradition theorising. In contrast to 
the first two chapters, where realism and the work of Cavell were taken 
as examples of synthetic cross-tradition theorizing, in the remaining 
chapters Arnold seeks to engage in aporetic cross-tradition theorizing 
himself.  It is here that Arnold turns to the work of Arendt and Pettit on 
freedom and Rawls and Derrida on justice. Each of these chapters 
represents an attempt to demonstrate the viability of the aporetic mode 
by showing ‘that a crucial feature of the concept theorized by a 
representative of one tradition cannot be harmonized with another 
crucial feature of that concept when theorized from the other tradition’ 
(76). The account of Arendt and Pettit spans two chapters which deal 
with freedom as such and political freedom respectively. At issue in both 
is the problem of control: whether it concerns freedom in general or 
political freedom, Pettit and Arendt’s respective approaches to control 
do not fully explain the density of the concept of freedom. As such, an 
aporetic approach is necessary to do justice to the complexity of freedom 
as a dense concept. 
For Pettit freedom in general is understood in terms of responsibility. 
Responsibility gives a richer understanding of freedom than accounts 
which focus on the rational control of one’s actions or the ability to align 
one’s actions with second-order desires (volitional control) because, in 
Pettit’s account, freedom as responsibility requires the agent to exert 
‘discursive’ control over the connections between their actions (81). 
Responsibility arises from the ability to give an account for the links 
between actions, for which rational and volitional control are necessary 
but not sufficient conditions. For Arnold, this leaves three common 
questions about freedom unanswered: what is its value, can freedom be 
spontaneous, and to what extent can we distinguish between acts that 
are considered as free because we exercise them consciously and those 
that arise from ‘virtual’ control or habit (84-9). These criticisms are 
introduced to facilitate the transition to Arendt’s concept of freedom, 
wherein freedom has a clear value: the capacity to create something new. 
Moreover, free acts must not be guided or dictated by others or by the 
self. They must be spontaneous (92-5). Free acts create something new 
under conditions of spontaneity while also maintaining that this act is 
intelligible to others. Arendt’s account of freedom shows, in contrast to 
liberal theories of non-interference, that a lack of control of the 
sovereign self is valuable for free action. While Arnold is more critical of 
Pettit than Arendt he is not dismissive of the former: the purpose of this 
comparison is to highlight that freedom as control and freedom as a lack 
of control represent irreconcilable accounts of freedom that 
nevertheless both have something valuable to say about freedom as a 
dense concept. 
This insight is pursued further in Arnold’s account of specifically political 
forms of freedom in Pettit and Arendt. Both accounts fail to exhaust the 
permutations of political freedom as a dense concept. Pettit elaborates 
upon the conditions of freedom as non-domination, where republican 
institutions are intended to ensure that political decisions and forms of 
interference are non-dominating insofar as they track the interests of 
citizens (106-7). Freedom is conditioned as citizens can be subject to 
interference so long as their interests are tracked, and thus enhanced, by 
government action (106-8). In contrast, Arendt is concerned with 
institutions that support isonomy, or the ability to participate in 
unconditioned ‘disclosive’ action that reveals something about the world 
and that makes it meaningful to others (124-5). Isonomy is Arendt’s 
response to the conditions of modernity in which the ability of all to 
participate in political action is negated by conditions of alienation from 
both oneself and the world (125-7). Arnold’s account is intended to 
bring out the difference between Pettit and Arendt in sharp relief. 
Arendtian political freedom is incompatible with the kind of interference 
Pettit describes, no matter how non-dominating it intends to be, and the 
republican theory of non-domination would require a degree of self-
control and control by the state for actions to be classed as free that 
would be unacceptable for Arendt. 
As we already know, the aim of this account of Pettit and Arendt is not 
simply to state that they have different accounts of freedom. Instead, 
Arnold aims to show how they each run into difficulties that provide 
meaningful insights about the nature of freedom as a dense concept. 
While he seeks to distance himself from the difficulties associated with 
positive liberty that also plague forms of republicanism, Pettit fails to 
eliminate them. The classic critique of positive liberty is that aligning the 
state with the interests of citizens in a way that shapes the liberty of 
those citizens requires interference which, in Rousseau’s famous words, 
forces those citizens to be free (109-11). Pettit’s version of political 
freedom is intended to avoid the problems of republicanism in the 
Rousseauian and Kantian traditions, but for Arnold the state fostering of 
discursive control ends up repeating the problems of positive liberty. 
Arendt is faced with the opposing problem. A political entity based on 
the ideal of isonomy might have as its aim the defence of the right to 
unconditioned action, but it is difficult to conceive of an institution which 
could both create and maintain a political space while also refraining 
from controlling actors within those spaces (132-45). A synthetic 
account of freedom in Pettit and Arendt would attempt to iron out these 
issues by combining their opposed approaches into a single system. 
Arnold’s case, however, is that there is more value in treating them as 
distinct and irreconcilable approaches that are plagued by their own 
problems. If political concepts are dense, then a single, synthetic account 
would still fall short of the impossible goal of unifying several 
perspectives in a way that exhausts the complexity of political concepts. 
The same approach is applied in Arnold’s reading of Rawls and Derrida, 
where he focuses on their attempts to provide non-metaphysical 
accounts of justice. Arnold gives an account of the changes that Rawls’ 
makes to his system between Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, 
focusing on the stability of the principles of justice chosen from behind 
the veil of ignorance. In Theory of Justice they are chosen according to 
rational principles shared by all individuals, whereas in Political 
Liberalism the definition of society used to guide deliberation within the 
original position represents the fundamental ideas of constitutional 
democracies (143-144). For Arnold, this non-metaphysical justification 
made with reference to historical conditions fails as it invests the 
historical trajectory towards liberalism with metaphysical significance 
for considerations of justice (154-5). Derrida’s account of justice suffers 
from the opposite problem. Here the question posed by Arnold is how 
one can move from a quasi-metaphysical account of justice to a historical 
account of its permutations? Arnold does an admirable job of simplifying 
the aporias within Derrida’s understanding of justice: justice requires 
the absolute singularity of the decision, as it is ‘owed to a singular other’, 
but it must occur through the application of rules which are not singular 
(163). Justice, therefore, is irreducible to history but must be realized 
within it. The issue that Derrida runs into here, according to Arnold, is 
the necessity of law in this process. Why must justice take place through 
legal institutions? This is clarified with respect to Derrida’s account of 
forgiveness: even though no act of forgiveness can live up to the 
forgiving of the unforgivable, we would nevertheless still recognise an 
act of forgiveness as participating in this unreachable ideal form. This is 
not true of justice: it is manifestly clear that legal institutions do not just 
live up to the ideal of justice because it requires an unconditioned 
decision on behalf of the other, but also because some legal institutions 
would not be considered to be just in any manner. Bridging the gap 
between justice and history is difficult for Derrida, insofar as it is unclear 
why justice as a quasi-metaphysical idea must be realised in the factual 
institution of law (169). 
In Arnold’s account, both Rawls and Derrida fail to produce non-
metaphysical conceptualisations of justice. The former turns to history 
but by doing so transforms its contingencies into metaphysical 
justifications, whereas the latter fails to provide a convincing reason for 
the link between a quasi-metaphysical form of justice and the historical 
fact of law. Again, a synthetic account of justice would eradicate this 
complexity. The density of the relationship between metaphysics and 
politics can only be fully appreciated in an aporetic mode where the 
need to dispense with metaphysics must co-exist with the necessity of 
metaphysical grounding (170). This problem cannot be overcome, and 
therefore a synthetic approach to it will necessarily fail in its attempt to 
do so. 
Arnold concludes with three reasons why the model of aporetic cross-
tradition theorizing demonstrated across the accounts of freedom and 
justice in Pettit, Arendt, Rawls and Derrida is a desirable one. First, the 
aporetic mode is more viable than the synthetic because it refuses to 
treat political problems as ‘solved,’ whereas the synthetic mode attempts 
to resolve political problems despite the impossibility of this task in the 
face of dense concepts (172-5). A brief example is given here of how calls 
for reparations from the accumulation of American wealth through 
slavery are characterised by complex and contradictory elements of 
historical and metaphysical justifications which an aporetic form of 
theorising might make sense of. Second, aporetic theorising challenges 
the cloistering of intra-tradition debates and opens political theory to 
new discussions and the discovery of new problems (178-179). Third, 
and similarly, it fosters an ethic of openness and responsiveness to the 
differences between approaches to political theory as a discipline and a 
recognition of how what is common within one part of the discipline 
may, in fact, pose a serious intellectual problem in another. 
Arnold’s case for the aporetic mode is a compelling one, particularly in 
the context of methodological developments in political theory that call 
for comparative methods that refuse the possibility of exhaustive, 
synthetic theoretical enterprises. However, we might consider the extent 
to which aporetic theorising, while appealing, is truly agnostic with 
respect to the traditions that it attempts to treat equally. If we take 
Arnold’s own definition of analytic political philosophy, it would appear 
that the aporetic method is something that most analytical thinkers 
would view as defeatist obfuscation. Contrastingly, this method fits very 
neatly into the continental perspective which seeks to press problems in 
order to uncover aporias rather than resolve them.[1] Aporetic cross-
tradition theorising may draw on both traditions, but it could be said to 
do so from a broadly continental perspective that focuses on the value of 
intellectual aporias. Of course, Arnold’s perspective is an account of the 
intellectual characteristics of analytic political philosophy as a tradition. 
Justification may be an aim of this tradition as a whole, but individual 
thinkers would most likely accept the point that no single account will 
exhaust a particular political problem or phenomena. Understood in this 
way Arnold is brought back to the agnostic ground between continental 
and analytical perspectives, as the eponymous aporia of the aporetic 
approach could be seen to represent a claim about intellectual inquiry 
rather than the nature of political problems. 
However, Arnold does hold to the stronger version of this claim which 
stresses that dense political concepts cannot be fully explained. This is 
noteworthy because density does not necessarily have as its consequence 
a total failure of explanation. While analytical thinkers may indeed 
accept that no single account exhausts the density of concepts, this 
tradition as a whole would be more receptive to the gradual unpacking 
and explication of dense concepts across multiple, competing accounts of 
the phenomena they represent. Here complexity is not insurmountable. 
In contrast, continental thinkers would be more likely to hold to a 
thicker understanding of complexity in which both the phenomena and 
the explanation are equally complex, and which must be integrated into 
the very nature of political inquiry. Density in the analytic tradition is a 
concern for the political philosopher, whereas in the continental it is the 
political itself which is dense and thus complexity is a concern for both 
the theorist and the political agent. We might also note here that 
Arnold’s account of the problem of the return of metaphysics faced by 
the post-metaphysical political theories of both Rawls and Derrida is a 
quintessentially a continental way of thinking about these problems. 
Indeed, it is one that is explored within Derrida’s own work. While 
Arnold might be seen to be agnostic with respect to the two traditions, 
insofar as he characterises political problems themselves as aporetic he 
could be seen to be a ‘continental’ thinker. 
Leaning to one side or the other of the divide is not necessarily a 
problem for Arnold’s position. Analytic or continental thinkers engaging 
in cross-tradition theorising have to start from somewhere. However, 
this unacknowledged propensity towards one side rather than the other 
belies challenges that face the argument made in The Great Divide. While 
political phenomena are treated as dense, one might also note that the 
divide between analytic and continental thinkers is itself a dense and 
complex concept. Arnold does not give the impression that he is of the 
opinion that his account of the difference between the two traditions is 
the only one. However, the multiplicity of ways of distinguishing 
between the two traditions is a problem that is not dealt with in the 
course of the defence of aporetic cross-tradition theorizing. Moreover, if 
the division between the two traditions is contested, one might also 
contest the division between synthetic and aporetic modes of cross-
tradition theorising. The aporetic and synthetic modes are not 
necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive: one might engage in aporetic 
inquiry and recognise elements of two thinkers that can be synthesised, 
or one might engage in a synthetic inquiry that highlights incompatible 
aspects of two systems of thought. 
Arnold’s conclusions are pre-empted with the claim that while cross-
tradition theorising is taking place between political theory and other 
disciplines, there is a lack of cross-tradition theorising that ‘moves 
between’ analytic and continental political theory (171). This advocation 
of the aporetic mode takes the above points for granted: the difference 
between the two traditions is simple rather than complex, that the 
complexity of political phenomena is by necessity irreducible to 
explanation, and that synthetic and aporetic methods represent mutually 
exclusive methodological alternatives. The case for taking the aporetic 
path is a convincing one insofar as it presents methodological pluralism 
as a worthwhile goal. However, if disciplinary pluralism is our aim, then 
the most fruitful approach may be to commit more fully to the 
methodological agnosticism that Arnold sets out. While synthetic 
theorising may fail in the particular case of realist accounts of legitimacy, 
it is not clear that this rules out in advance the impossibility of situations 
where synthetic theorising is more beneficial than aporetic theorising. 
As noted above, the gap between the critique of Cavell’s claims about 
violence and his textual method indicates that such an approach may be 
fruitful insofar as Arnold does not present a convincing argument as to 
why Cavell’s failure to account for state violence is necessarily a result of 
his synthetic method, instead of a result of a disagreement about 
legitimacy itself. 
Understood in this way, political theory might be best served by an 
understanding of synthetic and aporetic modes of cross-tradition 
theorising that sees them as tools to be used as appropriate for the 
political and conceptual challenges facing the theorist. Such an approach 
would go some way to alleviating the way that Arnold leans towards a 
more continental approach in his advocation of an aporetic method and 
would further the ethos of disciplinary pluralism that implicitly 
underpins his argument. I do not wish to suggest that any of these 
objections invalidate Arnold’s argument–far from it. The value of The 
Great Divide is that it makes space for further discussion about how 
political theory navigates its own disciplinary divides, and for this it is a 
laudable intervention. 
 
[1] Here I refer to the work of Thomas J. Donahue and Paulina Ochoa 
Espejo, to which Arnold also refers. See: ‘The analytical–Continental 
divide: Styles of dealing with problems,’ European Journal of Political 
Theory, 15:2 (2016): 138–154 
 
